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Abstract 
Within philosophy, cooperation has primarily been analyzed in the context of  theories of  collective 
intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of  
agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of  
cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of  minimal cooperation that can arise 
among members of  potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, and governmental 
bodies). I argue that members of  organized groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of  playing roles in 
an organizational structure and having a common goal. The minimal form of  cooperation considered here is 
not grounded in collective intentions involving symmetric mental states, special collective intentional modes, 
or joint commitments. More generally, I show how considering minimal cooperation in the context of  
organized groups provides an opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which the social world and social 
phenomena depend on internalist mental factors (e.g., intentions, beliefs) and externalist non-mental factors 
(e.g., laws, job descriptions). The view of  minimal cooperation among members of  organized groups 
developed here provides support for an externalist rather than internalist theory of  at least one social 
phenomenon. 
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Within philosophy, cooperation has primarily been analyzed in the context of  theories of  collective 
intentionality. On these views, cooperation is taken to involve complex often symmetric mental 
attitudes. These theories center their discussions on small groups usually involving pairs of  agents 
who interact with mutual knowledge of  (some of) the others’ intentions, beliefs, ends, and 
commitments (Bratman, Gilbert, Searle, Tuomela). An alternative account of  cooperation relies on 
game theory. On these accounts, the focus is on cooperation in large unorganized groups, like 
participants in political demonstrations or flash mobs. Paternotte, a proponent of  a using 
cooperative game theory to analyze minimal cooperation, takes collective intentionality accounts to 
center on “egregious cooperation” and argues that an analysis could be “weakened without making 
cooperation disappear” (2014, 48). Here I focus on a third sort of  group—organized groups—and 
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develop a novel account of  minimal cooperation that relies on neither collective intentionality nor 
cooperative game theory.  
 Organized groups—like corporate teams, committees, and legislative bodies—need not be 
composed of  pairs or small groups of  agents with mutual knowledge of  collective beliefs, 
intentions, goals, and so on. They are not mere coalitions of  agents, as in cooperative game theory. 
Instead, they involve individuals and organizational structures with roles for members to play. I 
argue that members of  organized groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of  playing roles in 
an organizational structure and having a common goal. The view departs from the analyses of  
cooperation that begin with collective intentionality and those that begin with game theory. The 
minimal form of  cooperation is not grounded in complex mental states/representations or in 
beneficial payoffs. We will see that roles individuals play in organizational structures are central to 
account for the form of  minimal cooperation developed here. 
 Considering cooperation between members in organized groups will also prove illuminating 
in assessing the extent to which theories of  social interactions, and perhaps social ontology more 
generally, should be construed in internalist or externalist terms. Call views of  social phenomena and 
entities centered on mental representation, mental states, or mental contents internalist views of  
the social.  Call views that rely on features that are external to mental states or mental contents—2
for instance documents, laws, or material resources—externalist views of  the social.  When 3
analyzing cooperative interaction between two agents working in close proximity, it is plausible that 
both agents have representations of  the other agent and of  (some of) her beliefs, desires, and 
intentions. That is, an account that is largely internalist is plausible. However, once we move to a 
scale at which there are multiple agents interacting in organizations that involve defined roles and 
action-types, the situation is different. Agents need not personally know all the people with whom 
they cooperate or have complex representations of  others’ mental states, or so I will argue. It is 
useful to have well defined roles for senators and for members of  a corporate team as they require 
one to do less mental work to understand what others believe, intend, and so on. It is costly to 
represent others’ mental states. It is far easier to represent roles which are simplified in ways that 
 Even if  one is a mental externalist, one could be an internalist about the social. On such a view one holds 2
that social entities, facts, collective intentionality, etc. depend on mental states or mental contents that are 
themselves dependent on external features of  the natural or social environment. 
 The distinction is not exclusive as views might include both mental and non-mental features. A view might 3
be more or less internalist/externalist. See Torrengo (2017) for a recent defense of  externalism about 
institutions. I discuss his view further in §IV.
2
agents—in their full psychologically complicated glory—are not. Playing a role is central to the more 
externalist account of  minimal cooperation among members of  organized groups developed here. 
 The article is structured as follows. I begin (§I) by considering the nature of  organized 
groups. In particular, I consider the ways organized groups are structured to involve roles that are 
defined in ways that are interdependent. Then (§II) I consider three prominent views of  collective 
intentionality and how they falter when extended to large organized groups. Since members of  
organized groups can be minimally cooperative and their cooperative behavior is not well captured 
by extending a theory of  collective intentionality, we need to look elsewhere to understand this form 
of  minimal cooperation. Next, (§III) I argue for a view of  minimal cooperation that relies on roles 
group organizational structures impose and a common goal. Then I consider internalist and 
externalist views of  the social and whether we should expect a unified account of  cooperative 
activity (§IV). Most theorists hold largely internalist theories of  social entities and phenomena 
according to which mental states and representations ground or constitute the social world and 
social phenomena. I show how the view of  minimal cooperation among individuals in organized 
social groups supports externalism about at least some social phenomenon. Finally (§V) I draw 
concluding remarks. 
§I. Organized Groups and Group Roles 
 Before an analysis of  cooperation by members of  organized groups can be undertaken, we 
need a better understanding of  the nature of  organized groups. In Ritchie (2013, 2015, forthcoming) 
I argued that groups like corporate teams, committees, clubs, the U.S. Senate, and British Parliament 
are entities with organizational structures. Organized groups are not merely structures. That is, they 
are not identical to structures. Rather they are entities that have members that are structured or 
organized in a particular way; they are structured wholes. 
 The structures of  organized groups consist of  roles and relations between them. Roles are 
defined in terms of  relations to other roles, tasks that role-players are allowed or required to carry 
out, and in some cases specific features a role-player must have. Relations between roles might be 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical. Relations that involve deference and power are hierarchical. For 
instance, a role might allow a role-player to give orders to individuals playing other roles. Relations 
of  seconding a motion or reporting on a project involve relations between group members that are 
non-hierarchical. Relations between roles also capture the ways playing a role depends on other roles 
being played. In discussing organizations Miller (2014) states that “there is a degree of  
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interdependence among … roles” and that “the performance of  the constitutive tasks of  one role 
cannot be undertaken, or cannot be undertaken except with great difficulty, unless the tasks 
constitutive of  some other role” are undertaken. Roles are largely defined in terms of  relations; they 
are interdependent.  
 Roles are also defined in terms of  powers, norms, and responsibilities. These might involve 
relations to other role players. For instance, some roles involve the power to give directives to other 
role holders. Norms about how to properly interact might also be part of  what defines a role. Roles 
might also involve powers, norms, or responsibilities pertaining to particular tasks. For instance, 
some role might involve being responsible for the group’s media presence, while another gives 
power and responsibility to a role player to control fundraising efforts. 
 Finally group organizations might place particular restrictions on who can play a role. For 
instance, one might be required to be born in a particular country, be at least 35, or meet other 
external requirements like being appointed or elected by non-group members.  A role may also allow 4
for multiple role-players or only allow for a single role-player. This could also be specified by a 
requirement on the role itself.  
 Consider a simple example of  a committee with roles for President, Vice President, 
Secretary, Treasurer, and Member without a leadership role. The role of  the president might involve 
calling meetings to order, delegating tasks to members of  the committee that do not have leadership 
roles, initiating votes, and so on. The president role might be specified so that only someone with a 
particular nationality can play the role. The Member role plausibly allows for more than one role-
player, while other roles might allow for only a single role-player.  
 The Senate, a corporate team, and other organized groups are not just organizational 
structures. The structure of  a group captures its functional organization, but an organized group 
itself  is an entity that is structured or that has a structure. While a precise metaphysical account of  
organized groups is not needed for our purposes here, being clear that organized groups are not 
identical to structures is important for several reasons. First, the same organizational structure might 
be had by more than one group. For instance, there might be many corporate teams or many 
committees with roles defined in the same way. If  groups were identical to structures, there could 
 The conception of  roles relied on here bears similarities to the way Koslicki defines places in structures. She 4
states that structures are “entities which make available positions or places for other objects to occupy, 
provided that these occupants satisfy the type restrictions imposed by the structure on the positions in 
question” and which impose on the objects “a particular configuration or arrangement” (2008, 235-6). Here I 
focus on more than just configuration or arrangement, but the focus on relations and type restrictions fits 
with part of  the picture I am offering.
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not be two groups with the same structure. Groups should not be identified merely in virtue of  
having the same organizational structure. Members of  a group matter for group identity conditions.  
 Second, organizational structures themselves might be abstract entities. Many philosophers 
take relations to be abstracta. If  organizational structures are complexes of  relations they would also 
be abstract entities. Yet, groups seem to be causally relevant and have spatial and temporal locations; 
they do not seem to be abstracta. Groups are, therefore, not just organizational structures. They are 
entities that have structures or that are structured.  
 An organized group comes to be when some people play the roles required by a group 
organizational structure. When some person, a, stops playing a role r and another person, b, starts 
playing r the group’s membership changes. While a was a member of  the group, she no longer is. 
More formally, we can define membership in an organized group as follows: 
  Organized Social Group Membership: Some things, X, are the members   
  of  a group with an organizational structure S at time t and world w  
  if, and only if, together X play the roles in S (i.e., X are related or   
  normatively bound in the ways required by S).  5
The definition of  membership allows for organized groups to change members and captures how 
membership relates to a group’s organizational structure.  6
§II. Collective Intentionality and Cooperation 
 Analyses of  cooperation have been addressed largely in the context of  collective 
intentionality. One might think the explanation as to why discussions of  cooperation have focused 
on collective intentions is obvious—cooperation involves collectively intending to φ with others. So, 
the thought goes, an account of  collective intention will also be an account of  cooperation. I will 
ultimately challenge the idea that all cooperation requires collective intentionality. To see why, we 
first need to consider how collective intentionality is understood.   
 Definitions of  cooperation usually involve “a set of  individual intentions that have certain 
origins and enjoy certain relations, all of  which is common knowledge (that is, public or transparent) 
 This definition is as in Ritchie (forthcoming), but departs from those in Ritchie (2013, 2015). Note that the 5
predicate ‘together X play the roles in S’ is a collective predicate. That is, it applies to some things X without 
applying to each of  the individuals (contrast with ‘is tall’ in ‘the players are tall’, compare to ‘surround the 
building’).
 Organized groups might also persist through changes in their organizational structure. Here I will not 6
develop a theory of  how much structural change a group can sustain. 
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among agents” (Paternotte 2014, 47). While sharing a common core, views vary according to 
whether they involve primitive irreducible we-intentions, the ways they take individual intentions and 
plans to be involved, and whether plural subjects are relied upon. They also vary in being causal or 
normative explanations.   
 Bratman, Gilbert, and Searle offer three prominent accounts of  collective intentionality and 
cooperation.  Bratman (1992, 1999, 2014) argues for a reductive account of  what he calls ‘shared 7
cooperative activity’. He analyzes “we intend to J” in terms of  individual attitudes as follows: 
  We intend to J if  and only if  
  1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J. 
  2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of  1a, 1b, and meshing subplans 
  of  1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of  1a, 1b, and   
  meshing subplans of  1a and 1b. 
  3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us. (1999: 121) 
The account reduces collective intentionality to individual intentions with subplans that are 
consistent and can be jointly satisfied (i.e., that “mesh”) and common knowledge of  one another’s 
intentions.  
 Gilbert (1989, 2006) argues for an account based on joint commitments and plural subjects. 
She takes a plural subject to be formed via a joint commitment to do something as a body. Joint 
commitments involve obligations to the others with whom one formed the commitment to carry 
out the activity to which they committed. They also give one the right to rebuke other parties in the 
joint commitment if  they fail to act in a way that is appropriate to their goal obtaining. Gilbert holds 
that forming a joint commitment requires all of  the parties bound by it be involved in its creation 
(2006: 135, 138, 168). She states “[t]he parties to a joint commitment … are those who comprise 
both its creator and its subject” (135). Going further she states that it is a “condition that all of  the 
parties must be involved in the creation of  a joint commitment” (ibid.).  Further, prior to forming a 8
joint commitment all involved must express “readiness for joint commitment” which must be 
common knowledge among them (2006: 138). In her final analysis Gilbert states that “[t]wo or more 
people are acting together (doing something together) if  and only if: (1) they are jointly committed 
to espousing as a body the appropriate goal; (2) they are fulfilling the behavioral conditions 
 For an account relying on a so-called we-mode see Tuomela (2006). Miller (2001) gives an account of  7
collective ends or goals that does not rely on collective intentions. 
 There are, however, points at which Gilbert appears to want to walk back from this strict requirement. For 8
instance, she states that there are cases “where one or more people sign on to a joint commitment originally 
created by others” (2006: 134). Given the role creation is given in her account of  plural subjects and joint 
commitments, the theory would need to be modified to allow for joint commitments to bind those who are 
not co-creators.
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associated with the achievement of  that goal; (3) their satisfaction of  these conditions is motivated 
in each case by the existence of  the joint commitment” (2006: 146). Gilbert’s account is non-
reductive, as committing to do something as a body does not reduce to individual commitments or 
beliefs. 
 Finally, Searle (1990, 1995, 2010) argues for a view of  collective intentionality that relies on 
primitive irreducible we-intentions, but which does not require a plural/group subject or meshing 
sub-plans. He argues that when engaged in cooperative collective action participants each have 
intentions of  the form ‘we intend that we φ’. According to Searle this involves a special collective or 
we-mode of  intending that is not reducible to mere individual intentions in an I-mode. Searle’s 
account also involves common knowledge. He states that “[c]ooperation implies the existence of  
common knowledge or common belief,” but common knowledge “together with individual 
intentions to achieve a common goal is not by itself  sufficient for cooperation” (2010, 49). Rather, 
he holds that “[c]ooperation requires the collective intention to cooperate,” which is an intention 
that we cooperate or that ‘we intend that we φ’ (2010, 58).  9
 It is worth noting that the core cases on which Bratman, Gilbert, and Searle focus involve 
small groups of  individuals. Gilbert states that “[i]n the example of  acting together on which I focus 
there is no hierarchy, the people involved certainly know of  one another and are in the midst of  a 
relatively substantial personal interaction” (2006: 99).  Similarly, after mentioning basketball teams 10
and orchestras, Bratman states that “to keep things simple” he will focus only on “shared 
cooperative activities that involve only a pair of  participating agents and are not the activities of  
complex institutions with structures of  authority” (1992: 327). He suggests that we can “gain some 
insight” into shared intentionality by starting small and that “[p]erhaps our theory of  small-scale 
shared agency can, with due adjustment and further additions, be extended to … larger social 
organizations” (2014: 8). Starting with simple cases can be a good methodological strategy. Simple 
cases are easier to analyze; they have fewer “moving parts”, if  you will. If  one is concerned with 
understanding how cooperative or collective behavior comes to be, simple cases rather than highly 
complex institutional cases also seem like a more fruitful place to begin inquiry. However, even if  
 Searle also discusses what he calls ‘collective recognition’, a notion that is weaker than cooperation. He says 9
that “collective recognition need not be a form of  cooperation and thus does not require a collective 
intention to cooperate” (2010, 58). Here I am concerned with considering whether cooperation should 
require collective intentionality in the way theorists have often argued. So, I focus on Searle’s view of  
cooperation rather than collective recognition.
 Although, Gilbert (2006) takes it to be possible for there to be large plural subjects which are impersonal 10
(i.e., in which not all members know one another personally), anonymous (i.e., when members do not know 
that particular individuals exist at all), and hierarchical. 
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starting with simple cases is justified, it would be hasty to conclude that the same analysis of  simple 
cases can always be scaled up to larger organized groups.  
 Groups like teams, committees, and legislative bodies are very different from two people 
going for a walk together or three people cooperating while preparing a meal. They involve 
organizations that have defined often hierarchical roles. Organized groups can vary in members 
across times and worlds and may be extremely large. They seem different from Gilbert’s plural 
subjects which are formed whenever some individuals form a joint commitment to do something as 
a body. Moreover, individuals who are currently members of  a group might not have been involved 
in forming the group, its organizational structure, or its goals. Recall that Gilbert requires that all 
parties bound by a joint commitment must be involved in creating it. In passing several times she 
states that individuals might join joint commitments, but her theory as espoused in (2006) would 
need to be modified to allow for this. In considering Gilbert from here, I will be considering her 
account as stated. On that account, members of  many organized groups do not form plural subjects. 
Yet, she requires plural subjects in her account of  acting together.  
 Members of  some groups—like a large legislative body or a corporate team—might not 
know every other members. They also might not know which individuals are playing which roles or 
whether there are multiple individuals playing some roles. If  a member, a, does not know that b is a 
member of  the group, it is implausible to suppose that a has representations of  b’s intentions, 
beliefs, or plans. Knowing that there are particular roles being played is not enough to enable one to 
have representations of  mental states. After all, roles don’t have mental states! Further, members of  
an organized group might not know what many roles involve. They might not even know what roles 
the group organization includes.   
 Without knowing who is playing a role the accounts given by Bratman and Searle appear not 
to apply. On Bratman’s account individuals are required to have knowledge of  others’ intentions in 
order to engage in cooperative shared activity. Having a we-intention, as required in Searle’s account 
of  cooperation, might not be possible without knowing who is included in the group or plurality 
picked out by we. Even the condition of  common knowledge or belief  is challenged by the epistemic 
opacity about individual identities that can occur in large organizations. For instance, if  p being 
common knowledge among a group G requires that each member of  G have representations of  
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others knowing that p (as well as iterations of  higher-order attitudes), then knowing who the 
members of  G are is required for common knowledge.  11
 Members of  organized groups certainly seem to be able to cooperate. Members of  teams, 
committees, and legislative bodies do complete goals, often in ways that are more efficient and 
effective than an individual or unorganized group of  individuals could. Any account of  cooperative 
activity that is meant to be general, must be able to account for such cases. The accounts just 
considered cannot, at least in their current forms, correctly accommodate all cases of  cooperation. 
Moreover, it does not appear that they can be easily modified to handle the cases I focus on here. 
This is particularly so for Bratman and Searle’s accounts. The methodological assumption of  starting 
with small group one-off  interactions and scaling up to large group long-term interaction should be 
abandoned. 
 In the next section I argue for a form of  minimal cooperation that relies on roles in a group 
organizational structure. Collective intentionality as analyzed by Bratman, Gilbert, and Searle is not 
necessary for minimal cooperation among members of  organized groups. Before turning to what I 
take is required for minimal cooperation in organized groups, what I am not arguing for needs to be 
clearly specified. 
 My aim is not to argue that the accounts of  collective intentionality and cooperation just 
considered fail. One of  the accounts, or another in the same spirit, might be correct for small 
groups working together on a specific joint action. For instance, a case of  two people organizing a 
closet together might require symmetric attitudes involving representations of  others’ mental states. 
Moreover, Bratman and Gilbert explicitly state that these are their primary target cases.  So, my 12
argument is not against their accounts given their particular target phenomena.  
 I am also not arguing that members of  organized groups never cooperate in ways that should 
be analyzed in terms of  joint commitments, representations of  others’ intentions, or we-intentions. 
Rather, I argue that there are cases of  minimal cooperation among members of  organized groups 
that do not involve collective intentions as spelled out in any of  the accounts just considered. The 
accounts considered above fail to give necessary conditions for minimal cooperation. A theory 
 Not all definitions of  common knowledge require that agents know who all of  the members of  the set of  11
group are. Gilbert (2006) argues that ‘population common knowledge’ can hold even in cases in which group 
members do not know one another, but do know that there is a relevant population. So Gilbert’s account 
does not succumb in this way. However, given that she does spell out joint commitments and plural subjects 
in a way that requires creation by all those committed, her account still falters. See also Paternotte (2014) for 
discussion of  common knowledge in conditions of  anonymity and further citations.
 Although Gilbert (2006, especially Ch. 8) argues that the account can be extended to large social groups like 12
societies. I return to her account below. 
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relying on collective intentionality might be correct for cases involving extensive or what Paternotte 
calls “egregious” cooperation, but minimal cooperation among individuals playing roles in group 
organizations does not place such stringent mental requirements on agents. 
 Finally, I am not claiming that the creation of  organized groups or organized group 
structures is independent of  collective intentionality. It might be the case that an account of  
collective intentionality like those just considered is often part of  the explanation for how organized 
groups or a group structures come to be. For instance, some individuals might form a we-intention to 
create a certain group or a group with particular defined roles. Tomasello suggests that cooperative 
interaction in humans requires that “participants coordinate their roles—their plans and sub-plans 
of  action, including helping the other in her role as needed—which are interdependent” (2009: 61). 
These minimal roles that are formed in one-off  joint actions are plausibly the precursor to the 
reified institutionalized roles that humans create in organized group structures. I am not arguing for 
a view of  how organized groups or group structures come about. As far as I am concerned here, it 
is an open question whether a group coming to be requires collective intentions. That is a question 
in social ontology, rather than a question about the conditions required for cooperation. Instead I 
am arguing that even if  complicated symmetric attitudes, the formation of  a joint commitment, or 
special we-intentions are needed to bring about an organizational structure or a group, these are not 
necessary for members of  organized groups to minimally cooperate. 
 To put the point another way, consider diachronic and synchronic accounts of  cooperation 
in organized groups. It might be true that a complex representational account with symmetric 
attitudes is required to create an organized group with a particular structure composed of  roles and 
relations. A diachronic account may rely on a view of  cooperation like one discussed above. Yet, 
once an organized group with various defined roles exists, minimal cooperation need not involve 
anything as mentally complex as that posited by Bratman, Gilbert, or Searle. A synchronic account 
of  minimal cooperation among members of  an organized group, might be quite different. The 
organization with defined roles allows for group members to minimally cooperate by playing 
particular roles.  Once a group is “built” the ladder of  collective intentionality that was used in 13
 Tollefsen suggests something similar about group agents. She states that “the performance of  joint actions 13
on the basis of  group ends, shared intentions, joint commitments, or we-intentions might very well be the 
way in which corporate agents form and sustain their agency over time… group ends, joint commitments, 
shared intentional activity, and we-intentions might all be part of  what is happening internally within 
corporate groups, and this produces a pattern of  group behavior that exhibits unified agency” (2015: 47). 
Here I am focused on members of  a group cooperating, rather than on whether a group is an agent, 
nevertheless there are similarities in my argument and Tollefsen’s remarks. 
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constructing it can be “knocked away”.  Once an organizational structure is in place, complex 14
mental work involving mutual knowledge, representations of  others’ mental states, and formation of  
joint commitments are not necessary for cooperation.  
§III. (Minimal) Cooperation + Roles 
 In §I I argued that organized groups are structured wholes. They have structures with roles 
that are defined in ways that depend on relations to one another. The interdependence of  roles 
relates to the powers, obligations, and rights role-players have. It also relates to the way actions 
undertaken by one role-player might be part of  larger actions that involve other role-players. 
Organizational structures with defined roles allow for a division of  labor and also for a division of  
knowledge. No one member of  a team might understand the entire range of  activities and roles 
involved. Organizational structures can allow many individuals together to carry out complex actions 
that no one member could fully understand or complete. 
 Let’s consider an example. Suppose a consulting firm is tasked with determining whether a 
merger between Company A and Company B would benefit Company A. In order to determine 
what to recommend, thereby meeting their goal, the firm puts together a consulting team with 
various roles. Suppose further that the team has many members who are located across multiple 
offices and that many team members do not know of  one another. Roles involve responsibilities and 
obligations that normatively bind role-players in various ways. The consulting team includes roles 
that require role-players to research similar past mergers and pass findings on to members who will 
include them in a report. Other members have roles that require analyzing a merger’s impact on 
stockholder and customer perception. They too report their findings to members tasked with 
writing a final report. And so on. Through many members playing their assigned roles—that is, 
carrying out tasks and interacting in ways team roles require—the team concludes that Company A 
should merge with Company B as it will benefit Company A to do so. 
 In the example, some individuals might have been working closely with others in ways that 
fit with accounts like Bratman’s, Gilbert’s, and Searle’s. Yet, other members never directly interact 
and have no knowledge of  one another. The team had the goal of  determining whether a merger 
should be recommended. Every member, let’s suppose, knows that she is part of  a team that has 
 The argument made here bears similarities with Bar-On’s (1995) reconstrual of  Gricean intention-based 14
semantics. She argues that problems for the Gricean can be avoided if  speaker intentions aren’t needed to fix 
meaning now (i.e., intentions are not needed for a synchronic account of  nonnatural meaning that has been 
conventionalized), even if  meanings were fixed by intentions in the past (i.e., speaker intentions are part of  a 
diachronic account of  nonnatural meaning). She also uses the metaphor of  “kicking away the Gricean 
ladder”.
11
said goal. Each intends to act in a way defined by her role to meet the goal. The team met its goal in 
a way that involved collaboration and, it would be natural to say, cooperation. Yet, the case does not 
involve cooperation on any of  three accounts considered in the last section. Let’s see why.  
 Bratman requires that each of  the individuals participating in shared cooperative activity 
know that each other individual with whom they are cooperating has an intention of  the form ‘I 
intend that we J’. Suppose that Kai and Simona are two members of  the consulting team. Neither 
knows the other personally and neither knows that the other is playing a particular role in the team. 
Kai does not know that Simona has an intention of  the form ‘I intend that we determine whether a 
merger between Company A and Company B should be recommended’. Kai does not even know 
that Simona exists, so she knows nothing about her mental states! If  Bratman’s account had to be 
met for some individuals to be engaged in cooperative action, the members of  the team would not 
count as cooperating even in a minimal sense. The account fails to capture that this is a case of  
cooperation. 
 Gilbert requires that two or more people cooperatively carrying out an action together are 
motivated by the existence of  a joint commitment (this is condition (3) in her analysis quoted 
above). She also holds the joint commitments must be created by all of  the parties bound by the 
commitment.  In the case of  the consulting team, both conditions could fail. For instance, Simona 15
might not be motivated by the joint commitment to meet a certain goal, but rather to a commitment 
to play the role that she has been assigned. She might want to play that assigned role because she 
cares about the firm, others’ perceptions of  her, keeping her job, or for any number of  other 
reasons. She still seems to be at least minimally cooperating, even if  she is not motivated by a joint 
commitment. This alone is sufficient to show that Gilbert’s account would not classify the team 
members as cooperating. Further Simona might not have contributed to forming the commitment 
to determine whether Company A should pursue a merger with Company B. In fact, no member of  
the team needs to have been involved in setting this as the team’s end. The commitment to that end 
might have been set by those higher up in the larger hierarchical organization of  the consulting firm. 
Given that the team members are cooperating, meeting Gilbert’s account cannot be necessary for 
minimal cooperation. 
 As noted above, Gilbert appears to want to allow for cases in which to join a joint commitment that they 15
did not create. However, her view as espoused in Gilbert (2006) carries an explicit requirement that joint 
commitments require co-creation by all those they bind. If  her account is going to handle cases like those 
involving organized groups considered here, it needs to be modified so that not all parties of  a joint 
commitment are required to be creators.
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 Searle requires we-intentions and common knowledge for cooperation. The case under 
consideration can be augmented to explicitly involve members of  the team who lack we-intentions 
but who are, at least in a minimal sense, cooperating with others. Suppose that Layla is another 
member of  the team. Layla has no thoughts in an irreducible we-mode, but Layla does intend to play 
her role as well as possible. She understands that playing her role involves others playing their roles. 
For instance, she knows that part of  playing her role is to pass information on to others on the team 
and that others cannot successfully play their roles without her playing her role. Yet, she never has a 
we-intention. She thinks about what she is doing and about the goal she’s taking part in, but lacks we-
intentions. By amending the case in this way, it does not seem that we-intentions have been smuggled 
in. And if  they have been an argument to that effect is needed.  Moreover, it seems that Layla is 16
cooperating with others on the team to provide information for a report and on determining 
whether to advise Company A to pursue a merger. This provides evidence that Searle’s account also 
fails to establish necessary conditions for cooperation.  
 The corporate team case involves roles that require individuals playing them to cooperate, at 
least in a minimal sense. Playing a role places normative demands on how role-players are to interact 
and what they are supposed to do. If  roles are played, role-players will interact in ways that aim at a 
shared end in what appears to be a case of  cooperative activity. This is so even if  members of  the 
team do not know of  others and do not have representations of  others’ mental states. The accounts 
of  collective intentionality fail to categorize the behavior of  the members of  the team as 
cooperative; a different account of  minimal cooperation is needed. 
 An account of  the cooperation in the cases just considered needs to take seriously the 
relevance of  roles in an organizational structure. I propose that there is a minimal form of  
cooperation in which some individuals cooperate in φ-ing just in case they play roles in an organized 
group structure that work towards a common goal. Roles in a group structure function together to 
allow the larger group to achieve ends or goals. They are defined in ways that are interdependent, 
that are normatively binding, and that require interaction to achieve goals. Minimal cooperation is 
achieved when playing roles is combined with a common goal. 
 The minimal sort of  cooperation I propose here is not as robust as cooperative activity as 
theorized by Bratman, Gilbert, Searle, and others. It need not involve being motivated by a joint 
commitment, having representations of  others’ intentions, or having special we-intentions. But, I 
 More generally one might challenge the notion of  we-intentions as a special primitive irreducible mode of  16
intending. Tollefsen says that we-intentions “seem pretty mysterious” and that “[n]othing in our experience 
and in our everyday practice of  ascribing intentions to others…seems to confirm their existence” (2015: 33). 
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take it that it fits with a common sense understanding of  cooperation. In the case studies, individuals 
are working together by playing roles to achieve a goal. That certainly is, at least, a minimal form of  
cooperation in the way we ordinarily understand it. 
 The way roles are institutionalized or reified in group organizational structures allows for 
more minimal mental requirements on agents engaged in cooperative activity. Members of  certain 
sorts of  groups—those with organizational structures—can cooperate in a way that requires less 
internal mental representation and less in terms of  motivational requirements. Individuals must play 
their roles that aim at a common goal. Playing a role requires standing in the right relations to other 
group members, completing particular tasks, and having certain rights and obligations. The complex 
mental demands placed on individuals by accounts that start with pairs of  individuals coordinating 
action are not necessary when individuals play roles in groups with organizational structures. While 
individuals in groups will have intentions and might have representations of  others’ mental states, 
these are not required for minimal cooperation given the existence of  defined roles in an organized 
group structure.  
 One might worry that the account I have offered is too minimal. Let’s consider two cases that 
might be used to press the worry. First, consider a spy network. The individuals in the network 
might not know anyone else in the network. Moreover, they might not understand what their roles 
are, what end they are helping to work towards, or how they are contributing to that end. 
Nevertheless, the combined efforts of  those in the network might fulfill the end. Are they 
cooperating? Intuitions about such cases are mixed. The account I have given could be adapted to 
accord with both stances on the case by expanding on what is required for a common goal. If  one 
takes the spies not to be minimally cooperating, the account could be adapted to require some mental 
requirements on having a common or shared goal. For instance, one might argue that minimal 
cooperation in φ-ing requires playing roles in an organized group structure that they work towards a 
goal that all know. In the spy network case, not all know the goal, so the case does not involve 
minimal cooperation. In contrast, if  one takes the spies in the network to be minimally cooperating, 
one could take having a common goal to require less. It might require that roles are functionally 
integrated to achieve an end. Or, one might require just that someone with authority over the group 
know the goal for it to be a common goal.  
 Second, consider the parts of  a car engine. Each part plays a role so that together they 
function to convert chemical energy into mechanical energy in order to move the car. They do not, 
however, seem to be cooperating even in a minimal sense. Just functioning in concord is seemingly 
not enough for cooperation. While the account of  minimal cooperation I have given emphasizes 
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roles and function, it does not take the parts of  a car engine to be cooperating. To see why, note that 
I argued that there is a form of  minimal cooperation that involves playing roles in an organized group 
structure. Roles in group organizational structures involve norms. Role-players are obligated to one 
another and have responsibilities to complete tasks, give directives, and report to others. The 
organizational structure of  a car engine is defined in terms of  ways parts operate, but not in terms 
of  norms. The members of  the corporate team are correctly classified as minimally cooperating 
while the parts of  the car engine are not taken to be minimally cooperating. While more could be 
said to develop a theory of  minimal cooperation among members of  organized groups in greater 
detail, I will leave the account as sketched here. In the next section I briefly consider how the 
account fits into the larger project of  theorizing social phenomena and social ontology. 
§IV. Internalism, Externalism, and Continuity in Social Theorizing 
 Accounts of  social phenomena, social entities, and social facts have largely centered on 
mental representation of  some form or other. Moreover, as we saw there has also been a common 
assumption that theorizing about the social can start small and then be scaled up. Torrengo argues 
that many hold a continuity thesis he spells out as follows: “[s]ocial phenomena are determined by 
collective intentions and their shared contents in small groups as much as (and in the same ways as) 
in complex social situations” (2017: 70).  The preceding discussion could serve as a challenge to 17
certain views that center on mental representations, mental states, or mental content. Whether it 
challenges the continuity thesis depends on how small scale cases should be understood. To clarify 
the discussion, I return to the terminology introduced earlier.  
 As I use the terminology internalist views of  the social are views that take social phenomena 
or entities to be grounded, constituted, constructed … by mental representation, mental states, or 
mental contents. On my usage externalist views of  the social are those that take social phenomena 
or entities to be grounded, constituted, constructed… by features that are external to mental states 
and mental contents, like documents, laws, or material resources. 
 As we saw above prominent accounts of  collective intentionality and cooperation rely on 
representations of  others’ intentions, special ways of  intending, and common knowledge. Such 
views are, at least to a large extent, internalist. Views that are more internalist than externalist are 
 Note that Torrengo argues that the continuity thesis is false. 17
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also common in social ontology. Collective attitudes, intentions, and representations of  a kind itself  
are often taken to constitute or ground social entities and facts.   18
 Other views in social ontology make mental states, contents, and representations less 
central.  Thomasson argues that some social kinds might not depend on representations of  19
themselves. She states social entities like “racism, economic recessions, class systems, and gender-
biased power structures are typically not intentionally created (either directly or indirectly) by 
accepting constitutive rules about entities of  that kind” (2009: 549). They are, instead, “byproducts 
of  more basic social and institutional facts” (ibid.). A general view of  social ontology should not be 
so internalist so as to necessitate that representations of  social entities are operative in the 
construction of  the social world.  
 The argument I gave above goes further. It is not just that minimal cooperation does not 
require a representational state about being cooperative. It is the stronger general claim that collective 
intentions, recognition, acceptance, and joint commitments are not necessary for minimal 
cooperation at least when individuals are members of  an organized group. The view is more 
externalist than a view that only goes so far as to reject that a social kind K relies on representations 
of  K.  
 The argument I gave is closer to views that give accounts of  social entities in terms of  non-
mental features. For instance Epstein (2015, 2017) argues that facts about social entities can depend 
on facts that do not involve mental states, intentions, or even people. Torrengo (2017) recently 
argued for an externalist view of  social entities. On his view institutional facts and entities are not 
always grounded in collective belief, acceptance, or intentions, rather institutions and institutional 
statutes, duties, and rights “are characterized by [and grounded in] the tendency to defer to elements 
that are external to the content of  collective intentions—such as laws, declarations, and 
contracts” (2017: 67). I agree that not all social entities and not all social facts are characterized by or 
 For instance, Searle (2010) argues for a social ontology that relies on collective acceptance of  constitutive 18
rules. Hacking (1999) argues for a view on which mental representations of  “interactive kinds” lead 
individuals to “modify their behavior” when they become aware of  being classified in a particular way (e.g., as 
a woman, as a refugee, as a Black person) they may “modify their behavior accordingly” (1999: 32). Mallon 
recently defined social construction projects as accounts that explain “by appeal to our practices of  
representing” (2016: 1). He argues for an account of  social kinds or roles “that are structured by the 
representations of  human categories and, over time, by the causal effects of  such representations” (2016: 
210).
 Khalidi argues along the same lines holding that the existence of  some social kinds fail to require that 19
attitudes “be directed towards the kind itself ” (2015: 104). See Ruben (1985) for arguments that certain social 
phenomena can exist without being noticed (e.g., exploitation). See Guala (2010) for arguments that we might 
lack knowledge of  social kinds, even if  they depend on collective intentions. 
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grounded in ways that a largely internalist view of  the social requires. Moreover, the argument I have 
given shows that externalist views of  the social can be extended beyond social entities to at least one 
social phenomenon. 
 Whether the preceding argument supports a rejection of  the continuity thesis depends on 
what is required for cooperation in pairs or small groups. Here I have argued that members of  
organized groups can cooperate without shared mental states, we-intentions, or joint commitments. I 
have not, however, argued for a view of  what is required for cooperation among individuals who are 
not members of  organized groups. So, the status of  the continuity thesis is left open and two 
possibilities arise. If  an account like Bratman’s, Gilbert’s, or Searle’s is correct for cooperation at a 
small scale, then the preceding argument does require a rejection of  the continuity thesis. A more 
internalist account relying on collective intentions would explain cooperation in pairs or small 
groups. A more externalist account that relies on playing roles in an organizational structure would 
explain other cases of  (minimal) cooperation. This would rejection of  the continuity thesis and a 
methodology that seeks a continuous and single theory for cooperation in all cases. 
 Alternatively, one might take the preceding discussion to provide the beginning of  a 
framework for a theory of  cooperation that upholds the continuity thesis. On this view, cooperation 
would always involve playing roles in some structure or other—whether it is the structure of  a 
legislative body, that of  a family unit, or that involved when two people attempt to move a piano 
together. Such a view would be very different from the sorts of  views that have dominated the 
literature on cooperation and collective intentionality. It would uphold the continuity thesis at least 
to the extent that roles would be relied on in all cases of  cooperation. It is plausible, however, that 
any viable version of  a role-based view of  cooperation would also posit some discontinuity in the 
mental requirements for cooperation in small-scale one-off  interaction and for large-scale long term 
cooperation in organized groups.  
§V. Concluding Remarks 
 I have argued that there is a form of  minimal cooperation among individuals who are 
members of  organized social groups that does not depend on shared mental states, special we-mode 
intentions, or joint commitments. Roles in group organizations can be defined so that playing a role 
and having a common goal involves cooperating with others. The account I have given is not a 
general account of  cooperation. In its present form it applies only to cases in which individuals play 
roles in an organized group structure (i.e., to members of  organized groups). Yet, at least in these 
cases, externalism about the social holds for phenomena like (minimal) cooperation. 
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 Social phenomena and social ontology have largely been understood in internalist terms. The 
roles that representations and mental states play in the creation of  the social world are interesting 
and need to be better understood. Yet, they should not be overemphasized. As organizations 
become complex and institutions are reified, representations and mental states matter less. Even if  
internalist mechanisms are needed to build some foundational aspects of  the social world, the 
internalist ladder can be “knocked away” once complex roles and institutions have been created. As 
we extend our focus beyond pairs of  individuals or small groups to complex institutionalized groups 
and contexts, the social—even social phenomena like cooperation—can and should be theorized in 
ways that are more external. 
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